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PLEA BARGAINING: AN
UNNECESSARY EVIL
BY RALPH ADAM FINE*
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Supreme Court has acknowledged that
plea bargaining would not exist in what it called an "ideal
world."' Similarly, the Wisconsin Supreme Court recognizes
that, in the words of the current Chief Justice, Nathan S. Hef-
fernan, the practice does not "offer exact justice to the state
and the defendant"2 and "can tend to subvert the ends of jus-
tice rather than to advance them.' 3 As I point out in Escape
of the Guilty,4 plea bargaining is a double evil: it encourages
crime by weakening the credibility of the system on the one
hand and, on the other, it tends to extort guilty pleas from the
innocent. Nevertheless, an overwhelming majority of those in
the criminal justice system accept plea bargaining as an "im-
portant component of this country's criminal justice system."5
The natural question is "Why?" The answer is a combination
of "myth" and "expediency."
Most defenders of plea bargaining believe that without it
an already overburdened criminal justice system would grind
to a halt. Thus, for example, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
has recognized that "plea bargaining is accepted pragmati-
* Judge, Circuit Court of Milwaukee County, Wisconsin; Author, ESCAPE OF THE
GUILTY (Dodd, Mead & Co. 1986). © 1987 Ralph Adam Fine.
1. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison, 431
U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
2. Armstrong v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 282, 287, 198 N.W.2d 357, 359 (1972).
3. Pontow v. State, 58 Wis. 2d 135, 142, 205 N.W.2d 775, 779 (1973).
4. R. A. FINE, ESCAPE OF THE GUILTY (1986).
5. Bordenkircher, 434 U.S. at 361-62; Blackledge, 431 U.S. at 71.
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cally as a device to speed litigation .... 6 As we shall see,
however, this "system would become clogged" rationale is a
myth. Plea bargaining has been successfully abolished when
those in the system have wanted to make a ban work: in
Alaska; in New Orleans, Louisiana; in Oakland County (Pon-
tiac) Michigan; in Ventura County, California; and, in a petri
dish example, in New Philadelphia, Ohio. Stripped of the
only reason for which courts have tolerated the practice, plea
bargaining stands naked against the winds of justice.
"Plea bargaining" is that bushel basket of practices
whereby a prosecutor agrees to:
- charge a crime or crimes less seriously than the facts
warrant, and/or
- reduce a charge or charges already issued, and/or
- dismiss a charge or charges already issued, and/or
- not issue additional charges, and/or
- make a sentence recommendation all in return for a
guilty or a no contest plea. It includes what has variously
been described as "charge bargaining" and "sentence bargain-
ing" as well as "plea bargaining." Importantly, however,
whatever form the leniency takes, the leniency is payment to a
defendant to induce him or her not to go to trial. The guilty
or no-contest plea is the quidpro quo for the concession; there
is no other reason. Thus, plea bargaining does not encompass
those situations where the facts of a particular case may jus-
tify a lenient sentence, a dismissal, or reduction. Obviously,
for example, if a case initially charged as "first degree mur-
der" is discovered to be, in reality, "manslaughter," reducing
the charge to "manslaughter" is not plea bargaining but jus-
tice. By the same token, consideration to a defendant may be
warranted, in appropriate cases, to get his or her help in
catching or convicting a "bigger fish" or to avoid the trauma
of a trial for a particularly fragile victim. 7 Again, this is not
6. Armstrong, 55 Wis. 2d at 287, 198 N.W.2d at 359.
7. The "spare the victim" excuse for leniency raises difficult questions, some of
which the Wisconsin Supreme Court has addressed in the context of a child abuse case:
Were the district attorney to decide not to call the child as a witness, the district
attorney may protect the child's emotional interest in not being forced to face the
alleged abuser and accuse the abuser of criminal acts, but may inflict a greater
harm on the child by allowing the alleged abuser to go free and by demonstrating
to the child that the state of Wisconsin does not place a high enough value on the
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plea bargaining but - if appropriate - justice for society and
for the victim.
child's suffering to bring to justice the person alleged to have caused the
suffering.
State v. Gilbert, 109 Wis. 2d 501, 507, 326 N.W.2d 744, 747 (1982). Prosecutors must
avoid the trap of using expressed concern for a victim's sensibilities as a mere rationali-
zation for inappropriate concessions.
Recently, a young woman in California wrote to me of her ordeal. Those in the
criminal justice system had used the "spare the victim" excuse as one of the reasons to
permit her rapist to escape just punishment:
I was raped in my apartment one night in July of 1986. Although the rapist
wore a nylon stocking over his face, I recognized him as the man who had man-
aged the apartment building where I lived some years before. He was arrested
two days later, and I picked him out of a line-up without any problems. The
police also obtained substantial physical evidence against the man. In fact, the
detective in charge of the case told me that out of the approximately 600 rape
cases he had investigated, mine was the most "solid" he had come across.
In addition, the rapist had a long history of sexual abuse crime, and at the
time he raped me, he was on probation for child molestation. (Actually, he mo-
lested his five year old daughter, but the charge had been reduced to "Lewd and
Lascivious Conduct with a Child under 14," for which the Court placed him on
90 days probation!).
I have provided details because I think they help to explain my shock and
anger at what happened next. Two weeks later, I received a subpoena which
ordered me to appear in court .... I arrived at the courthouse early. I was
seared and nervous, and I had no ideas what to expect. I was instructed to sit in
a small room until the D.A. had time to see me, and I was informed that the pre-
trial hearing was scheduled for 10 a.m. The D.A. "found time" to see me two
very long hours later. As we were going over my statement, he received a phone
call which made him extremely happy, and which infuriated me. In the D.A.'s
words, "[the rapist] accepted our deal."
Although I requested him to explain the details of the plea bargain several
times, he avoided the question, but he did explain that plea bargaining was nec-
essary because if every case had to go to trial, the courts would be back-logged
for years, especially considering the high crime rate in the area (Oakland, Cali-
fornia). He also explained that even if we went to trial, and the rapist was found
guilty, some liberal judge may sentence him to less than what "we got" from the
plea bargain (I found this irrelevant and illogical). Finally, he told me that I
should be "happy" that he had "spared me the pain of going to trial." I was
amazed that a man whom I had not met at the time this "bargain" was planned,
had the extra-sensory power to know that I would be "pained" by going to trial.
In short, I felt cheated, and I still am very angry. Not only was I completely
ignored, but the rapist got a good deal."
My frustration increased geometrically as I confronted the courts. One judge
told me that I should "try to understand the poor guy because he was the prod-
uct of a broken home, alcoholic parents, and a poor childhood." That same
judge told me I should be "grateful that he didn't hurt me!" When I spoke at the
sentencing, the judge told me I should "just forget the whole thing," and that I
should have no trouble getting my life back together since I'm so young (I'm 25).
I find it hard to quantify the contempt I feel for those men.
1987]
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One of the excuses often advanced for plea bargaining is
that "half a loaf is better than none" when the evidence is
weak, and that it is better to "get a dangerous person off of the
streets for a short time" than risk an acquittal. This argument
was punctured by Dan Hickey, a chief prosecutor in Alaska
both before and after that state abolished plea bargaining in
1975:
It is, in essence, a meaningless gesture to take in a whole lot
of bad cases that can't be proved and bargain them out for
meaningless dispositions. It is no solution to crime in this
country to run someone through the process to get some
kind of conviction which, more often than not, is for some-
thing much less than they were accused of and which results
in something which really doesn't mean anything in terms of
real punishment.8
Charging a rape as "disorderly conduct,"9 for example, under
the aegis of a "half a loaf is better than none" theory disables
justice as the victim wonders, and the criminal gloats, at the
law's impotence.
II. THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST PLEA BARGAINING
The criminal law protects society in three major ways: de-
terrence, isolation, and rehabilitation. We attempt to deter
persons from committing crimes with the threat of punish-
ment, and rehabilitate those, who for one reason or another,
have not been deterred. If deterrence and rehabilitation both
fail, there is no alternative but to isolate the offender from the
rest of society through long-term incarceration.
A. Plea Bargaining Weakens Deterrence
The very essence of deterrence is credibility. As I point
out in Escape of the Guilty, we keep our hands out of a flame
because it hurt the very first time (not the second, fifth, or
Letter from Jane Doe to Judge Ralph Adam Fine (Mar. 9, 1987).
I have quoted the woman's letter at some length for two reasons. First, it shows that
at least some victims are tougher and have more resolve than many in the criminal
justice system believe. Second, I hope its eloquence will sway some of those who may be
skeptical of Escape of the Guilty's warning that plea bargaining is rotting the law's
integrity.
8. 60 Minutes (CBS television broadcast, Jan. 18, 1987) (emphasis added).
9. R. A. FINE, supra note 4, at 51-54.
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tenth time) we touched fire. If deterrence is to work, we must,
in the words of noted Norwegian law professor and criminolo-
gist, Johannes Andenaes, make "the risk of discovery and
punishment" outweigh "the temptation to commit crime." 10
Yet, plea bargaining destroys this needed credibility. A good
example is what happened in two states with strict gun laws.
Massachusetts and Michigan have both tried to control
the unlawful use of guns. Starting in April of 1975, someone
carrying a handgun without a license in Massachusetts faced a
mandatory one year in jail. Michigan's anti-gun law went into
effect in 1977 and required that an additional two years be
tacked on to any felony sentence if the defendant was carrying
a gun at the time of the crime. Prosecutors and judges in
Massachusetts took the law seriously and it worked. How-
ever, the Michigan story, as Harvard Professor James Q. Wil-
son relates, was different:
Many judges would reduce the sentence given for the origi-
nal felony (say, assault or robbery) in order to compensate
for the add-on. In other cases, the judge would dismiss the
gun count. Given this evasion, it is not surprising that the
law had little effect in the rate at which gun-related crimes
were committed."
As a 1973 report of the U.S. National Advisory Commis-
sion on Criminal Justice Standards and Goals concluded:
Since the prosecutor must give up something in return for
the defendant's agreement to plead guilty, the frequent result
of plea bargaining is that defendants are not dealt with as
severely as might otherwise be the case. Thus plea bargain-
ing results in leniency that reduces the deterrent impact of
the law. 12
Deterrence is, of course, further weakened as the criminal
brags about his deal and spreads word throughout the com-
munity that the law has no teeth. Dean Roscoe Pound of the
Harvard Law School, who studied plea bargaining in the
1920's, called it a "license to violate the law"'13 and, over a
10. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974).
11. Wilson, Thinking About Crime, ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Sept. 1983, at 79.
12. Church, In Defense of Bargain Justice, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 509, 517 (1979)
(quoting 1973 U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N. REPORT).
13. R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA, 184 (1930).
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hundred years ago, the Wisconsin Supreme Court derisively
condemned it as "a direct sale of justice."14
B. Plea Bargaining Weakens Respect For the Law
An essential component of rehabilitation is a respect for
society and its laws. However, plea bargaining teaches the
criminal that judges and lawyers can ignore the law when it is
expedient to do so. Significantly, many plea bargains result in
charges that cannot be sustained by the facts. One common
plea bargain in Wisconsin is to reduce a charge of "operating
[a] vehicle without [the] owner's consent," a two-year fel-
ony,15 to "joyriding," a nine-month misdemeanor, 16 even
though the car may have been damaged and return of the vehi-
cle undamaged within twenty-four hours is an element of the
misdemeanor charge."7 Prosecutors, of course, should issue
only those charges for which the evidence would support a
conviction at trial. 8 Milwaukee County District Attorney E.
Michael McCann, apparently goes a step further and advo-
cates an even more rigorous screening, at least under some
circumstances. Thus, several years ago, although he publicly
stated that two Green Bay Packers players accused of sexual
assault were guilty of "indecent and immoral sexual over-
reaching"' 19 and that their conduct in connection with the inci-
dent was "reprehensible, shameful and depraved, ' 2° he
declined to prosecute them because he "determined that the
state [would] be unable to prove the guilt of the two men be-
yond a reasonable doubt."' 21 This, as Wisconsin Supreme
Court Justices Donald W. Steinmetz and Roland B. Day have
noted,22 is an even stricter standard than that recommended
14. Wright v. Rindskopf, 43 Wis. 344, 354-55 (1877).
15. Wis. STAT. §§ 943.23(1), 939.50(3)(e) (1985-86).
16. Id. at §§ 943.23(2), 939.51(3)(a).
17. Id. at § 943.23(2).
18. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE Rule 3-3.9 (2d ed. 1986).




22. State ex rel. Unnamed Petitioners v. Connors, 136 Wis. 2d 118, 154 n.1, 401
N.W.2d 782, 797 n.1 (1987) (Steinmetz, J., and Day, J., dissenting).
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by the American Bar Association 3 and would, obviously, pre-
clude many plea bargain arrangements.
Nevertheless, plea bargaining often involves fiddling with
the facts.24 As a prosecutor told two researchers working
under a National Institute of Mental Health grant: "A lot of
fictions are entered into. For instance, with the elements. In
order to get within a lesser included offense, people kind of
fudge the facts a bit. I've seen some people plead guilty.., to
attempted possession of narcotics, and I think that is pretty
hard to do!"25
What is the "spree" criminal to think when it is "bargain
day" at the courthouse: four armed robberies for the price of
one? What is an impressionable young man to think when,
after smashing up a stolen car, he is allowed to plead guilty to
the reduced charge of "joy riding?" 26 As one commentator
has recently written, plea bargaining "often destroys the integ-
rity of the criminal justice system by allowing defendants to
appear to be convicted of crimes different from the ones they
actually committed. 27
One of the biggest fictions connected with plea bargaining
is the practice of permitting a defendant to plead "guilty"
while simultaneously proclaiming his or her innocence.
Although authorized by North Carolina v. Alford2 8 - which
was, significantly, a death penalty case - it is an Alice in
Wonderland expediency that vitiates public confidence in the
criminal justice system. Simply put, if we want defendants to
respect the law, we must enforce it with justice and honesty.
C. Plea Bargaining Tends to Extort Guilty Pleas
A 1967 report issued by the President's Commission on
Law Enforcement put the issue squarely: "There are also real
dangers that excessive rewards will be offered to induce pleas
or that prosecutors will threaten to seek a harsh sentence if
23. See supra note 18.
24. R. A. FINE, supra note 4, at 49-55, 68-71, 101, 107-08.
25. Hagan & Bernstein, The Sentence Bargaining of Upperworld and Underworld
Crime in Ten Federal District Courts, 13 LAW & Soc'Y REV. 467, 470 (1979).
26. See supra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
27. McDonald, Judicial Supervision of the Guilty Plea Process: A Study of Jurisdic-
tion, 70 JUDICATURE 203-09 (1987).
28. 400 U.S. 25 (1970).
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the defendant does not plead guilty. Such practices place un-
acceptable burdens on the defendant who legitimately insists
upon his right to trial."zgSix years later, the National Advi-
sory Commission of Criminal Justice agreed:
Underlying many plea negotiations is the understanding -
or threat - that if the defendant goes to trial and is con-
victed he will be dealt with more harshly than would be the
case if he had pleaded guilty. An innocent defendant might
be persuaded that the harsher sentence he must face if he is
unable to prove his innocence at trial means that it is to his
best interest to plead guilty despite his innocence. 30
The case that sanctions this type of extortion is Bordenkircher
v. Hayes,3' where the Supreme Court permitted a prosecutor
to "up the ante" in order to obtain a guilty plea on a bad
check charge. This is how the prosecutor put it when he ques-
tioned Hayes about it at a later hearing:
Isn't it a fact that I told you at[the initial bargaining session]
that if you did not intend to plead guilty to five years for this
charge and.., save the court the inconvenience and neces-
sity of a trial and taking up this time that I intended to re-
turn to the grand jury and ask them to indict you based
upon these prior felony convictions?32
An indictment as a repeater would subject Hayes, if con-
victed on the bad check charge, to a mandatory life term.
Nevertheless, Hayes exercised his constitutional right to a jury
trial and, true to his word, the prosecutor obtained the re-
peater indictment. Hayes was convicted and sentenced to the
mandatory life term. In affirming the conviction the Supreme
Court explained that there was no "punishment or retaliation
so long as the accused [was] free to accept or reject the prose-
cution's offer."' 33 The Court wrote:
Plea bargaining flows from "the mutuality of advantage" to
defendants and prosecutors, each with his own reasons for
wanting to avoid trial.... Defendants advised by competent
counsel and protected by other procedural safeguards are
presumptively capable of intelligent choice in response to
29. PRESIDENT'S COMM'N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMIN. OF JUST., THE
CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY 135 (1967).
30. U.S. NAT'L ADVISORY COMM'N OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE, COURTS 43 (1973).
31. 434 U.S. 357 (1978).
32. Id. at 358 n.1.
33. Id. at 363.
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prosecutorial persuasion, and unlikely to be driven to false
self-condemnation.34
Those in the system do have "their own reasons for wanting to
avoid trial" and, unfortunately, those reasons usually have
very little to do with "justice."
1. Advantages for Prosecutors
Prosecutors want to avoid trial for a number of reasons.
Perhaps the most important reason in the context of an analy-
sis of plea bargaining is that trials are hard work and many
prosecutors have heavy case loads. A case that is "dealt
away" is seen as a case that does not have to be tried. An
experienced assistant district attorney in Milwaukee County
once admitted to me that plea bargaining was a "concession to
the burned out" prosecutor that "keeps us on the job for ten
or fifteen years when we might otherwise burn out after two to
three. 35
2. Advantages for Defendants
Defendants also want to avoid trial for a number of rea-
sons. Those who are clearly guilty fear that once the judge
hears all the grisly details from the victims the resulting sen-
tence will be more severe than if the judge had heard a dispas-
sionate statement of the facts from the lawyers. Additionally,
defendants may fear that the prosecutor will recommend, and
the judge will impose, a more severe sentence just because -
in the words of the Hayes prosecutor - they both had to en-
dure "the inconvenience and necessity of a trial." Finally, of
course, defendants are usually getting great plea bargained
deals. In fact, one excellent and tenacious defense lawyer
once told me, on the record, that he was removing his client's
case from my court 36 because he had worked out a "great plea
bargain" with the prosecutor, which he did not think I would
accept. When I asked for specifics, he replied that he did not
want to tell me the deal because "[y]ou'd be so grossed out." 37
34. Id. (citations omitted).
35. R. A. FINE, supra note 4, at 72.
36. Wisconsin is one of the few states that permits a criminal defendant to peremp-
torily bump a judge from his or her case. See State v. Holmes, 106 Wis. 2d 31, 315
N.W.2d 703 (1982); Wis. STAT. § 971.20 (1985-86).
37. R. A. FINE, supra note 4, at 109.
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3. Advantages for Defense Lawyers
Many defense lawyers in the private bar rarely, if ever,
take criminal cases to trial; they plead their clients guilty.
That is the only way some of them can earn a living given the
fact that they usually represent people who have either very
little money or none at all. In the latter case, the lawyers are
paid by government programs and the fees are such that tak-
ing a case to trial is usually not economical. In the former
case, a client and his family may be able to come up with a few
thousand dollars. That is a handsome fee for an hour or so of
bargaining and a quick guilty plea; it is nothing for a jury trial
and the needed investigation and preparation. As Professor
Albert W. Alschuler has pointed out:
There are two basic ways to achieve financial success in the
practice of criminal law. One is to develop, over an extended
period of time, a reputation as an outstanding trial lawyer.
In that way, one can attract as clients the occasional wealthy
people who become enmeshed in the criminal law. If, how-
ever, one lacks the ability or the energy to succeed in this
way or if one is in a greater hurry, there is a second path to
personal wealth - handling a large volume of cases for less-
than-spectacular fees. The way to handle a large volume of
cases is, of course, not to try them but to plead them.38
A Boston lawyer he interviewed put it this way: "A guilty
plea is: a quick buck. ' 39 An attorney in Alaska was a little
more genteel and told National Institute of Justice research-
ers: "Criminal law is not a profit-making proposition for the
private practitioner unless you have plea bargaining." 4 The
simple fact is, as sociologist Abraham S. Blumberg pointed
out in a 1967 article entitled The Practice of Law As Confi-
dence Game, many criminal defense lawyers find it more ad-
vantageous to cooperate with prosecutors and judges who
press for guilty pleas than to zealously represent their clients.
After all, they must deal with them on a day to day basis. The
38. Alschuler, The Defense Attorney's Role in Plea Bargaining, 84 YALE L.J. 1179,
1182 (1975).
39. M. RUBINSTEIN, S. CLARKE & T. WHITE, ALASKA BANS PLEA BARGAINING
39 (National Institute of Justice 1980) [hereinafter M. RUBINSTEIN].
40. Id.
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client, on the other hand, is a transitory figure who is usually
- and quite literally - gone tomorrow.41
4. Defendants Are Vulnerable to Extortion
While the Supreme Court assumed that defendants would
be "advised by competent counsel," what advice can even an
eager and idealistic lawyer give someone in Paul Hayes' posi-
tion, assuming the financial aspects of the case did not chill his
or her willingness to take it to trial? Simply put, there is little
protection for the defendant who maintains his or her inno-
cence in the face of threats from an "up the ante" prosecutor.
Assume, for a moment that Hayes was innocent. If he had
pled guilty because of the prosecutor's threat, that would have
been precisely the type of "false self-condemnation" the Court
said could not happen. Although the Court opined that de-
fendants were "protected by other procedural safeguards,"
there are none in any court where the judge permits the prose-
cutor to "up the ante" on a defendant who refuses to cave in
and forego his constitutional right to a jury trial. Hayes was
punished by having his exposure increased to a mandatory
"life" sentence the moment he asserted his innocence and de-
manded that jury trial. Indeed, since a guilty person had the
choice between a sure five years or a sure life sentence, it can
be argued with some success that only an innocent person
would have rejected the prosecutor's deal.
In my three years of presiding full time over criminal cases
(in the Juvenile, Misdemeanor, and Felony divisions of the
circuit court), at least three persons later adjudged to be not
guilty attempted to plead guilty either because their lawyer
wanted them to, they feared an "up the ante" recommenda-
tion from the prosecutor, or they wished to "get the matter
over with." Importantly, the facts fully supported the acquit-
tals. An example of what Hayes hath wrought can be seen
from an incident I relate in Escape of the Guilty.
A Milwaukee county prosecutor initially offered a woman
accused of inflicting superficial wounds on her husband a
nine-month misdemeanor charge of "battery. ' ' 42 When she re-
41. See Blumberg, The Practice of LawAs Confidence Game: Organizational Coop-
tation of a Profession, 1 LAW & Soc'y REV. 15 (June 3, 1967).
42. Wis. STAT. §§ 940.19(l), 939.51(3)(a) (1985-86).
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fused to plead guilty, he - according to affidavits filed in the
case - charged her with the five-year felony of endangering
safety by conduct regardless of life.g3 When she refused to
plead guilty after the preliminary examination, the prosecutor
- again, according to affidavits filed in the case - "upped the
ante" to the twenty-year felony of attempted first degree mur-
der." When challenged in a "prosecutorial vindictiveness"
motion, the prosecutor dropped the case entirely.45
Significantly, when the United States Supreme Court first
had an opportunity to discuss the legitimacy of plea bargain-
ing as a tool of criminal justice in 1970, it approved the prac-
tice but cautioned against "the situation where the prosecutor
or judge, or both, deliberately employ their charging and sen-
tencing powers to induce a particular defendant to tender a
plea of guilty."46
A finely tuned criminal justice system will punish the
guilty and leave the innocent unmolested. We have already
seen how plea bargaining lets many criminals escape a "just"
punishment. Since the 1978 decision in Hayes, the innocent
have been at risk as well.47 Indeed, in the November 7, 1983,
issue of the National Law Journal, one legal commentator ar-
gued that guilty pleas should not be used as evidence in civil
lawsuits because of the tainting effects of plea bargaining:
43. Id. at §§ 941.30, 939.50(3)(d).
44. Id. at §§ 940.01, 939.32(1)(a), 939.50(3)(a).
45. R. A. FINE, supra note 4, at 79-83.
46. Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 n.8 (1970).
47. Herbert J. Stern, a former United States District Court Judge in New Jersey
and a former United States Attorney has catalogued the horrors:
We have developed a system of bargain and sale. Defendants are induced to
plead guilty by specific promises of benefit or threats of harm. Prosecutors,
aided and abetted by judges, are permitted to elicit courtroom confessions by
techniques that would turn our stomachs if they were employed in the station
house.
Defendants may be threatened with the possibility that more serious charges will
be brought against them unless they waive their sixth amendment rights and
plead guilty to lesser ones. Wives who refuse to plead may be threatened with
increased penalties for their co-defendant husbands. In places like New York,
defendants are permitted to plead to hypothetical crimes, to crimes which never
occurred, even to "logically impossible" crimes, all to make the sale possible and
move the docket along. We have even sunk to the level of permitting defendants
to plead guilty while professing their innocence.
Stern, Book Review, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1275, 1283 (1982) (citations omitted) (review-
ing A. GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY (1981)).
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"Since a defendant may plead guilty for numerous reasons un-
related to actual guilt, convictions stemming from such pleas
offer little assurance of reliability.
48
To an innocent person, even probation is a constant re-
minder of an unfair criminal justice system. To a guilty per-
son, unjustified leniency is a spur to further criminal activity.
In short, plea bargaining is an evil that doubly compromises
our criminal justice system: the guilty smirk at its impotence;
the innocent are rubbed raw by its haste.
III. PLEA BARGAINING IS UNNECESSARY
David L. Bazelon, the former Chief Judge for the United
States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, in a de-
cision written a year before Brady v. United States,49 recog-
nized that plea bargaining was not the imperative that all
seemed to assume:
The arguments that the criminal process would collapse un-
less substantial inducements are offered to elicit guilty pleas
have tended to rely upon assumption rather than empirical
evidence. In many jurisdictions lacking sophisticated re-
sources for criminal investigations, a large proportion of sus-
pects apprehended are caught virtually red-handed. The
argument 'But what if everyone did not plead guilty?' has
force only to the extent that a sizable proportion of defend-
ants have some motivation to plead innocent. If the defend-
ant does have some hope of acquittal, the right to a trial
assumes overarching importance. If he does not, there is
some presumption that most men will not indulge in a mean-
ingless act.5°
Some six years after Judge Bazelon wrote those words, his
prediction was tested when Alaska's Attorney General,
Avrum M. Gross, abolished plea bargaining statewide. Ap-
pointed Attorney General in December of 1973, Alaska's
unique centralized criminal justice system gave Gross control
over all of the state's district attorneys. His new policy was
announced in a memorandum dated July 3, 1975, and was ad-
dressed to "all district attorneys." With exceptions for unu-
48. Thau, How Lawyers Can Benefit From Trends in Collateral Estoppel, NAT'L
L.J., Nov., 1980 at 22, 26 n.5.
49. 397 U.S. 742 (1970).
50. Scott v. United States, 419 F.2d 264, 278 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (footnotes omitted).
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sual circumstances, permission for which "will be given
sparingly," there was to be no sentence concessions or charge
reductions in exchange for guilty pleas. Sentencing recom-
mendations and charge reductions could still be made, but
only if they were warranted by the facts and were not used
''simply to obtain a plea of guilty."
Before Gross' plea bargaining ban in August of 1975, the
practice was as endemic in Alaska as anywhere else. As one
judge related, it was part of the defense lawyer's job to go to
the district attorney "to see what could be worked out. 51
Often, a lot "could be worked out." An assistant district at-
torney told how one of his colleagues had eleven cases set for
trial in one week: "He hadn't even looked at one of the files.
He dealt them all out on the last day, and he was proud of
himself. I'm afraid we were giving away the farm too often.
It was a little difficult to sleep at night."' 52 This same prosecu-
tor then put it all in context:
The whole system became ridiculous. We were giving away
cases we plainly should have tried. We often said to our-
selves, 'Hell, I don't want to go to trial with this turkey; I
want to go on vacation next week.' We learned that a prose-
cutor can get rid of everything if he just goes low enough. 3
In 1980, the National Institute of Justice sponsored a
study of the Alaskan experiment. It concluded that, despite
all the dire predictions by the naysayers, the plea bargaining
ban was successful and "guilty pleas continued to flow in at
nearly undiminshed rates. Most defendants pled guilty even
when the state offered them nothing in exchange for their
cooperation."54
Additionally, contrary to all expectations, the cases were
processed more quickly without plea bargaining than they
were before its abolition. The National Institute of Justice re-
port puts it this way: "Supporters and detractors of plea bar-
gaining have both shared the assumption that, regardless of
the merits of the practice, it is probably necessary to the effi-
cient administration of justice. The findings of this study sug-
51. M. RUBINSTEIN, supra note 39, at 2.
52. Id. at 11.
53. Id. at 12.
54. Id. at 80.
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gest that, at least in Alaska, both sides were wrong."55
Indeed, the disposition times for felonies in Anchorage fell
from 192 days to just under ninety. In Fairbanks, the drop
was from 164 days to 120, and in Juneau, the disposition time
fell from 105 days to eighty-five.
Avrum Gross is no longer Alaska's Attorney General.
Yet, his reformation of that state's criminal justice system sur-
vives. It survives because those working in the system realize
things are better now. An Alaskan prosecutor probably said it
best: "Much less time is spent haggling with defense attor-
neys.... I was spending probably one-third of my time argu-
ing with defense attorneys. Now we have a smarter use of our
time. I'm a trial attorney, and that's what I'm supposed to
do."'5 6 Another attorney was even more upbeat: "My job is
fun now, and I can sleep nights." 57
Three other jurisdictions have also ended their reliance on
plea bargaining: Ventura County, California, a community of
700,000 just north of Los Angeles; Oakland County (Pontiac)
Michigan, a community not unlike Milwaukee County; and
New Orleans, Louisiana. There too, the bans have worked.
Indeed, in what I have earlier called a "petri dish example" of
how those with resolve can end the plea bargaining habit, Mu-
nicipal Judge Edward Emmett O'Farrell of New Philadelphia,
Ohio, has successfully abolished the practice in his jurisdiction
for drunk driving cases. Although the defense bar tried to
overwork him with cases during his first year, he stood firm.58
In 1986, only ten persons accused of drunk driving took their
cases to a jury: 322 pled guilty even though Judge O'Farrell
imposes fifteen days in jail for a first offense, ninety days in jail
for a second offense, and a year in jail for a third offense. Al-
cohol related traffic fatalities in his community fell from
twenty-one in 1982, to three in 1984, two in 1985, and four in
1986, showing that a staunch policy of non-bargained justice
does deter crime.
55. Id. at 102-03.
56. Id. at 46.
57. Rubinstein & White, Alaska Bans Plea Bargaining, 13 LAW & Soc'y REV. 367,
371 (1979).
58. Judge O'Farrell had 179 jury trials in 1982.
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A. We Should Abolish Plea Bargaining
Plea bargaining exists only because it is thought to be es-
sential to the efficient functioning of the criminal justice sys-
tem: "Whatever might be the situation in an ideal world, the
fact is that the guilty plea and the often concomitant plea bar-
gain are important components of this country's criminal jus-
tice system."59
The experiences of Alaska, Ventura County, Oakland
County, New Orleans and Judge O'Farrell prove that it is not
essential. Perhaps Judge Stern put it best when he compared
the system of plea bargaining to a "fish market" that "ought
to be hosed down." 60
We do not need plea bargaining - we should not tolerate
it. Abolition, however, will require work and dedication. As
Robert C. Erwin, then Associate Justice of the Alaskan
Supreme Court, told Professor Alschuler in a June, 1976
interview:
A no-plea-bargaining policy forces the police to investigate
their cases more thoroughly. It forces prosecutors to screen
their cases more rigorously and to prepare them more care-
fully. It forces the courts to face the problem of the lazy
judge who comes to court late and leaves early, to search out
a good presiding judge, and to adopt a sensible calendaring
system. All of these things have in fact happened here., 6 1
They can happen everywhere as well, if those in the system
only try. As Judge Stern told me, recalling his days as a fed-
eral prosecutor, "It worked for me, and I tell you, it would
work for anybody."6
B. A Proposal
First, there should be no reduction of a charge unless the
prosecutor can demonstrate, and the judge can specifically
find on the record, that:
59. Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 434 U.S. 357, 361-62 (1978); Blackledge v. Allison,
431 U.S. 63, 71 (1977).
60. Stem, supra note 47, at 1283.
61. Alsehuler, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 1029 n.81 (1979) (reviewing
C. SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE (1981)).
62. R. A. FINE, supra note 4, at 111.
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(1) There are facts that were unknown to the prosecutor
at the time the charge was issued that make a new charge
more appropriate;63 or
(2) There are other circumstances that may militate
against going to trial.64
Second, the prosecutor should certify, on the record, that
the charging decision was not based on a defendant's willing-
ness to plead guilty but on his or her independent evaluation
of the facts, including any circumstances that may militate
against going to trial.
Third, the prosecutor should certify, on the record at sen-
tencing, that the recommendation, if any, is based on the pros-
ecutor's independent evaluation of the facts and not a quidpro
quo for a guilty plea, except where there are other circum-
stances that may militate against going to trial.
IV. CONCLUSION
Plea bargaining is a blot on our criminal justice system. It
encourages crime and demoralizes victims and society. Aboli-
tion will restore a long-absent respect for the criminal justice
system.65 Not long ago, a woman told me how an acquain-
tance of hers bragged that he was going to beat a serious drug
charge. "Did you do it?" she asked. "Sure," was his cocky
reply. "Then why," she asked, "do you think you should be
able to get away with it?" His response was simple: "Because
I can." We teach society a dangerous lesson when people be-
lieve that they "should" get away with crime because they
"can."
On the average, there is a murder in this nation every
twenty-eight minutes, a rape every six minutes, an armed rob-
bery every sixty-three seconds, and a burglary every ten
seconds.66 Millions of Americans are terrorized by crime and
the fear of crime. Many - especially the elderly - have be-
63. See State v. Kenyon, 85 Wis. 2d 36, 270 N.W.2d 160 (1978).
64. Id.
65. One small step in the right direction in Wisconsin was the Supreme Court's
rejection of a proposal that would have, in effect, permitted judges to participate in the
bargaining process. In the Matter of the Amendment of Rules, 128 Wis. 2d 422, 383
N.W.2d 486 (1986) (percuriam).




come prisoners in their own homes as they hide from the
predators who roam our communities with impunity. Aboli-
tion of plea bargaining will be a major step in restoring peace
and dignity to the lives of our people. We will then have a
system that, at the very least, tries to offer "exact justice" not
only for the prosecution and the defense but for victims and
society as well.
Some will say that we cannot afford true justice and that
our prisons are already bursting from overcrowding. Yet, on
a per-serious-crime basis, we only imprison criminals at two-
thirds the rate we did in 1960.67 Additionally, we spend only
.6% of our federal, state, and local budgets on court services
and only .7% of those budgets on corrections.68 The cost of
crime - in tears as well as dollars - is infinitely greater. We
short change our citizens when we settle for a criminal justice
system that gives them much crime but little justice. The ex-
pediency-based practice of plea bargaining has done precisely
that. Our people deserve better.
67. BUREAU OF JUST. STATISTICS BULL., PRISONERS IN 1984, 6 - 8 (U.S. Dep't of
Just. 1985). Indeed, an analysis of the per-serious-crime imprisonment rate over the
years shows a chilling relationship between the ferocious explosion of violent crime we
have recently experienced and the lenient policies of the mid-1960s and 1970s. In 1960,
there were 6.3 prison admissions per 100 crimes. In 1965, the rate fell to 4.5. By 1970,
it dipped to 2.3 and remained below 3 per 100 serious crimes until 1981, when it rose to
3.5. Id.
Some who advocate a return to leniency point out that our prison populations have
risen as of late and the number of prisoners per 100,000 of population has never been
higher. The only meaningful measure of incarceration however, is that which compares
the lock-up rate with the number of crimes being committed. Despite the large number
of prisoners in this country, we have yet to reach the rate of incarceration per serious
crime we had in 1960.
As I point out in Escape of the Guilty, approximately two-thirds of all persons incar-
cerated for the first time learn their lesson and never return to prison. R. A. FINE,
supra note 4, at 248. Others, however, will remain a danger as long as they are free or
until old age has weakened their criminality. Thus, 61% of those admitted to prison in
1979 were repeaters and, ominously, 46% percent of them would have still been in
prison on an earlier sentence at the time of their new crime if they had not been released
on parole. Id. "The message is clear, deter those who can be deterred; incarcerate those
who cannot." Id. Sadly, efforts at rehabilitation - the concept that fathered the leni-
ency - have generally not worked to protect society. Id. at 40-41, 164-66, 247-49.
68. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISrICS, CRIME AND JUSTICE FACTS 19 (1986).
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